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ABSTRACT
The economic impact of defence and space expenditures has been an
important policy issue because of the secondary benefits expected
to be accruing from it. Although defence and space activities can
stimulate the early development of many technologies, the lasting
economic impact of these technologies is difficult to measure.
To capture the scientific and technological values added of de-
fence and space financed productions, we have depended on the
patents and scientific and technical publications as the indi-
cators. The economic performance has been measured by two sepa-
rate indicators: (a) firm growth in terms of average annual rate
of change in the number of employees, and (b) rate of return on
sales measured by the company's net profits in relation to sales.
From 1970-75 and 1980-85 the weight within the manufacturing
sector of both defence contractors and the civilian companies
increased. Defence firms gained considerably in terms of sales,
employment, gross plants and company funded R&D in the latter
period under the Reagan Administration. Whereas this may be con-
sidered a "Reagan effect" in defence procurement, other indi-
cators point to in the opposite direction: (a) decrease in the
shares of defence R&D contracts, (b) relatively low growth of
patent output as percent of total manufacturing from the defence
firms, and (c) decrease in scientific publications from defence
firms per 1000 employees.
Firm level analysis showed that military R&D contracts did not
contribute to economic or technical efficiency. Space expenditure
did not contribute to improvement of economic performance as
measured by company growth and profitability. NASA contracts were
not associated with technical progress measured by patents, but
they improved scientific publications. Defence expenditures are
not of importance for the overall economic efficiency. The stan-
dard financial variables, capital formation and own R&D activi-
ties prove mostly relevant. The study is restricted to an effi-
ciency analysis in a cross sectional comparison and does not in-










The economic impact of defence and space (D&S) expenditures has
been an important policy issue. Proponents of military and de-
fence budgets focus not only on the security needs of the country
as a justification for defence spending, but also on secondary
benefits expected to be accruing from it, so-called spin-offs.
Those opposing high military spending point out the opportunity
costs as well as the irrelevance of military technology and hard-
The study has been supported by a grant from the Fritz Thyssen
Foundation in Germany to the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft and a
grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to the New Jersey Insti-
tute of Technology. The authors are very much indebted to four
anonymous referees but remain fully responsible for the con-
tents and conclusions.
School of Industrial Management, New Jersey Institute of Tech-
nology, Newark NJ 07102 USA.
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Christian-Albrechts-Univer-
sitat, Kiel, Germany.
Both D&S equipment producing activities are dealt with in the
following, because both are considered important in the spin-
off debate; in addition, both kinds of productions overlap
considerably, with space activities financed by DoD as well as
NASA, and with NASA prime contractors regularly at the same
time being major DoD contractors. Data on the financial
amounts of contracts are available both for DoD and for NASA.- 2 -
ware for the civilian economy. Similar arguments have also been
voiced for space programs. The discussion about the impact of D&S
expenditures on the national economy has assumed a new level of
importance in recent years under the impression of shifting eco-
nomic power among major countries as well as under the impression
of fundamental changes occurring in the formerly socialist coun-
tries more recently.
Spin-offs of D&S technology can take place in many contexts. In-
ter-industry spin-offs involve transfer of technology from the
defence or space to the civilian sector in unrelated industries.
For example, the laser technology developed for strategic defence
programs may be used for ophthalmic surgery. Intra-industry spin-
offs involve transfer of military or space technology to the ci-
vilian sector within related industries. Transfer of military
aircraft technology to the civilian transport aircraft industry
is an example of intra-industry spin-offs. Finally, spin-offs can
be supposed to exist within the firm which is involved in de-
fence, space and civilian sectors, such as Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, General Electric, Saab, Mitsubishi, etc. The possibility
of intra-firm spin-offs was a forceful reason for the federal
Ministry of Economics in West Germany to approve the merger of
Daimler-Benz and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) in 1989. Des-
pite the difficulties cited for attaining economic welfare due to
the Daimler-Benz and MBB merger by the Monopoly Commission of the
West German Government, the Ministry of Economics approved the
merger on the following three principles: (a) the merger will
create system leadership through the MBB's technological know-
how, Daimler's managerial know-how, and Daimler's connection with
Deutsche Bank; (b) possibilities of spin-offs from MBB technology
to other business of Daimler-Benz, and (c) improved possibility
to compete with the monopolistic power of the American aerospace
firms in the international market [Ministry of Economics, FRG
1989]. Possibilities for such synergy and technology transfer
have lured many firms in the US for mergers and acquisition,
though with dubious results [Chakrabarti & Burton, 1983; Chakra-
barti & Souder, 1987; Chakrabarti, 1990b].o _
b. The Hypothesis
Secondary effects of D&S expenditures, if any, can logically be
positive or negative. The first will be labelled spin-offs, the
second inefficiencies. Spin-offs may occur because a new product
or a new technology is developed on account of contracts from the
Department of Defence or from NASA. The new product, or technolo-
gy, may - if sold to third parties - increase the production pos-
sibilities (or decrease costs of production) in other firms, too.
Thus, D&S procurement can foster progress in the private sector.
Inefficiencies may occur due to the constraints of competition
which often go hand in hand with government procurement, espe-
cially if secrecy requirements are a major feature of the con-
tracts; the costs of inefficiencies may again affect third par-
ties who e. g. buy inputs more costly. It can not be excluded
that both kinds of secondary effects exist, even at the same time
in the same firm. This would imply that analyses at the aggregate
level of a firm, or an industry, may only assess the net outcome
of spin-offs and of inefficiencies.
The hypothesis to be tested is that D&S related government pro-
curement leads to spin-offs which significantly outweigh inef-
ficiencies. In addition, it will be asked whether NASA-financed
activities are different from DoD-financed activities; since the
first is mainly concerned with space programs which also aim at
civilian use, spin-offs may play a more important role there.
In this paper we concentrate on the structural peculiarities of
the defence firms as opposed to non-defence firms and on the
aforementioned secondary effects of D&S expenditures, in parti-
cular the secondary effects on the performance of those US firms
which are the main D&S contractors. The structure of the paper is
as follows: The next section II gives an overview of the spin-off
literature, concentrating on the respective expenditures of the
United States government. Section III deals with the problems of
identifying spin-offs, discusses the method applied and describes
the data basis. Section IV contains the empirical results, the
implications of which are discussed in the concluding chapter V.- 4 -
II. SECONDARY EFFECTS FROM US DEFENCE AND SPACE EXPENDITURES
LITERATURE ANALYSIS
There appears to be a lack of systematic approach in the studies
related to the secondary effects from D&S expenditures. Different
authors have focused on different issues related to D&S technolo-
gy. Moreover, the research methods lack empirical rigor as they
tend to be anecdotal case studies. Consequently, it becomes dif-
ficult to compare these studies and seek any convergence in terms
of their findings. Based on their focus, the studies have been
grouped in different categories (cf. Table 1).
Focussing on the effectiveness of the institutional structure to
support technology transfer from D&S contracts, five studies out
of the ten came to positive conclusions. Four other studies con-
cluded that the institutional structure in D&S sector is not con-
ducive for effective technology transfer. The study by Hirsch and
Trento [1973] was inconclusive. Excepting Mathematica [1976] and
Mathtech [1977], all the other studies mentioned above are de-
scriptive and ad hoc in nature. They lack systematic research me-
thods to support their positive or negative conclusions. Although
Mathematica [1976] provided - in the context of NASA's expendi-
tures - empirical evidence to support a conclusion of positive
secondary effects, its research method needs to be discussed
before one accepts its conclusion at the face value. It studied
four technologies developed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, (1) cryogenic multilayer insulation materials,
(2) integrated circuits, (3) gas turbines in electric power gene-
ration and (4) a software for strucutral analysis. It estimated
the benefits of these technologies by computing the acceleration
of the development time attributable to NASA and the consequent
benefits. Mathtech [1977] used ten different NASA technology-
utilization programs, such as nickel zinc battery, human tissue
stimulator, computer software management center, etc., and esti-
mated the cost-benefit ratios using various discount; rates. Esti-- 5 -
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Did RDT&E produce a
major part of tech-
nical progress in
the aircraft sector?
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spin-offs?
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Source: Compiled from Schrader [1989a].- 7 -
mation of the benefits hinges on some critical assumptions and
thus makes the results suspect. Moreover, the problem of techno-
logy transfer is a complex one. In their study of transfer of
technology from the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, Chakrabarti and Rubenstein [1976] found that successful
cases of transfer involved personal linkage between the NASA
centers and organizations adopting the technologies. The personal
contacts often worked around the bureaucratic procedures for
technology transfer.
In terms of benefits to specific industries, some few studies fo-
cussed on the electronics industry in the US and concluded that
the impact of the defence sector on the elctronics industry had
decreased in later years; importance of the defence participation
in these industries decreased over time as more commercial firms
were engaged in development and production with the rise of de-
mand in the civilian sector. Current defence programs, such as
the very high speed integrated circuit program (VHSIC), are re-
ported to have not contributed to the civilian sector as "defence
needs have been met with ever more esoteric weapons-specific
technologies" [Borrus; 1988, p. 250]. In a similar vein, Miller
[1987] and Stowsky [1986] found out that the Strategic Computing
Initiative (SCI) program has contributed no spin-offs to the ci-
vilian sector.
Several authors investigated whether defence procurement had ac-
celerated the development of the electronics industry in the US
by creating and stimulating demand. Suppliers in this industry
depended on government contracts as these contracts constituted a
significant portion of their market share. Defence contracts also
helped to develop and maintain the product standards.
The aircraft industry has ever been the prime beneficiary of
military spending. Many studies point to the fact that the mili-
tary was responsible for developments in the aircraft industry:
Military aircraft is said to have been the precursor to civilian- 8 -
aircraft. One should, however, be cautious about the qualitative
historical case analyses reported in these studies. For example,
contrary to the claim of the US Airforce study, turbo-jet pro-
pulsion is of neither American nor military origin [Heinkel,
p. 396].
It is interesting to note that the empirical studies are concen-
trated in the field of analyses of NASA spin-offs, all carried
out in the 1970s. Four out of five studies did actually find
spin-offs whereas the Comptroller General did not.
Seven studies concluded that there was little benefit for the
machine tool industry. Others did not find any benefit of the de-
fence technology to improve the process technology in the manu-
facturing sector. Only Cypher [1987] saw a positive result in
terms of improving process technology. The problems here seemed
to be that the requirements of precision and quality in high
technology represented in the defence programs were not efficient
solutions for civil applications. The first generation of numeri-
cally controlled machine tools and the second generation of com-
puterized numerically controlled machine tools were developed
through the defence procurement, but did not readily find their
way into the civilian sector.
All in all, the impact of D&S expenditures on the economy may be
viewed as controversial. Although it is accepted that D&S activi-
ties can stimulate the early development of many technologies,
the lasting economic impact of these technologies is difficult to
assess. On a macro-economic level, Schrader [1989b] confirmed
earlier findings that military expenditure is, in a simple cor-
relation, negatively associated with real productivity growth;
for a group of countries including Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the- Netherlands, Sweden, Spain,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany, however,
military spending did not affect the growth rate of productivity
in the multivariate approach when considering also other vari-- 9 -
ables such as investment, per capita GDP, and government spending
without military expenditure. This points to the fact that the
impact of D&S expenditure may not be important for the whole eco-
nomy when compared with the impact of other economic variables.
III. IDENTIFIACTION AND MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
a. Identification Problems
Basically, spin-offs can be identified at four levels: within the
firm at the department level, at the firm level, at the industry
level, and at the level of the overall economy. It has been ar-
gued and in fact investigated - by collecting information from
firms - that new technologies are in most cases only passed on
among departments within the firm. This aspect of the intra-firm
level would make an analysis of firm data mandatory. In the se-
cond case of spin-offs created by firms and passed on among other
firms there seem to be two viable ways of analysis. The first
operates under the assumption of a profit maximising firm which
does not hand out technologies for free, but instead sells the
new products (production techniques) itself or sells the li-
cences; under this assumption the firm's economic performance
increases with the importance of spin-offs. The second viable way
assumes that if a firm passes on new technologies it does so in
most cases to firms of a similar production structure, i. e. to
firms of the same industry. Thus, even if a firm cannot reap in
the revenues from an innovation - as may be the case when proper-
ty rights are with the procuring government agency - the positive
effects will be revealed at the industry level. Finally, at the
macroeconomic level, identification of spin-offs has to rely on
international comparisons of macro-performance and e. g. of de-
fence shares in gross domestic products.
The research dealt with aerospace firms in the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany [Scientific Consulting, 1989] .- 10 -
The identification problem quite obviously tends to rise with the
aggregation of data: in general, the number and variance of the
determinants of success increase with aggregation, so that the
simple share of public-procurement induced spin-offs in the ex-
planation of performance decreases. When moving from the firm's
department level to the macroeconomic level, identification needs
increasingly powerful lenses to single out spin-offs.
In addition, defence procurement can be considered to be impor-
tant for only a few companies, such as the Grumman Corporation
which produces almost exclusively D&S equipment. For the fourteen
prime contractors receiving the largest amounts of contracts from
DoD, the share of defence business in total sales was between 37
percent and 50 percent in the period 1971 to 1985 [Glismann, Horn
1988, p. 152]. There may also exist smaller companies with large
shares of defence business which cannot be identified because
they do not show up in the statistics of prime contracts, due to
the (in absolute terms) small amounts of contract awards or be-
cause they are subcontractors.
All in all, there are drawbacks with respect to identifying spin-
offs at all possible levels of aggregation. In this study we have
put emphasis on analysing the existence of spin-offs at the firm
level of the engineering sector. The reasons are mainly that
(1) firm statistics regarding some of the most important indi-
cators for inputs as well as for output are available. This
criterion of availability makes the analysis at the firm
level superior to the department level where only scattered
information, if at all, exists.
On the other hand, but possibly rather far-fetched, one may
argue that in the case of a high mobility of researchers in
this field, spin-offs ought to be analysed at higher levels.
Thus, spin-offs of a researcher moving from one firm (or in-
dustry) to another, or using his spin-off potential for found-
ing his own company, can be observed with more confidence at
the aggregate level (however, a more aggregated analysis would
still be unable to cope with the international mobility of a
researcher).- 11 -
(2) the economic rationale of firms is relatively easy to deal
with. Firms act profit maximising. If they realize spin-offs
they can be expected to make them pay off - by producing new
goods, applying new technologies or by selling the spin-off
to other firms. Thereby the statistics of firms should re-
veal any exploitation of spin-offs. This is not so clear at
the industry level, where such a behaviour of firms may be-
come obscure due to the multitude and varieties of other
factors influencing performance.
(3) the production functions at the firm level can be assumed to
be less diversified among firms within a particular industry
- such as the engineering industries - than among industries
- such as engineering and chemical industries. This produc-
tion-function argument is certainly of major importance in
cross-section analyses where structural divergencies may
distort the outcome of a comparison of firms belonging to
different industries.
b. The Problem of Indicators
To analyse whether D&S expenditures lead to spin-offs produced by
conctracting firms one needs to develop a suitable indicator of
spin-offs. Since spin-offs mean that the people employed improve
their knowledge, or that machines are improved, or that a new and
different basket of products is produced, spin-offs have the same
properties as technical progress. In strict economic terms, such
a progress occurs when under the condition of constant employment
and constant input of financial capital, real output rises. Pro-
In other words: we address exploitation of firms' own techno-
logies, not other firms', which effectively means that spin-
offs are neither regarded as free goods nor as being stolen.
The fact that spin-offs are defined as external effects of D&S
contracts does not refer to economic externalities of the
firms producing spin-offs. Since we assume that firms reap in
the profits from spin-offs we assume, so to speak, internali-
sation of D&S externalities.- 12 -
ductivity increase becomes manifest in an increase in real value
added, due to product differentiation or through increased effi-
ciency in the production process [Chakrabarti, 1990a]. Measure-
ment of real value added or cost efficiency requires detailed
firm-level data using consistent definitions of costs and ac-
counting practices. Lack of availability of data mandates us to
use alternative means of measurement [Chakrabarti, 1989]: There
are basically two concepts of identifying the existence of spin-
offs at the firm level. The first looks at spin-offs as an eco-
nomically useful by-product of D&S production. From this it fol-~
lows that - as has been argued above (p. 11, para. 2) - spin-offs
can be identified by an increase in the profits of firms; firms
either use the by-product themselves, or they sell it. According
to this concept the amount of spin-offs of D&S procurement should
vary among firms by the amount of contract awards. To test this
we will take the rate of return on sales as a proxy. Second best
to this proxy of success would be a measure of firm growth be-
cause firms' growth defined by the increase in sales would not be
able to solve the problems of different rates of "inflation"
among firms; definition by a "real" variable, such as the number
of employees can be misleading because of factor substitution
taking place in the wake of spin-off creation. Nonetheless, firm
size as measured by the number of employees will be taken as an
auxiliary variable of economic success, the main reason being
The intrinsic question with this argument is about the r61e of
subcontracts: if a prime contractor passes on, say, 90 percent
of the contract award to subcontractors the spin-off potential
arises at the subcontracting level; then, it would be futile
to search for spin-offs at the main contracting level. Two
points seem to be worth mentioning which support the analysis
at the main-contracting-firm level: Firstly, statistics reveal
that subcontracting does not play such an important r61e in
DoD awards; a major contracting industry such as aerospace
(SIC 3721) had a share of only 6 percent of total government
procurement passed on to subcontracting firms between 1965 and
1982 (Source: cf. Table 2, p. 20, which also contains some
information on subcontracting in general government procure-
ment at the two-digit-industry level). Secondly, it can be
supposed that subcontracting firms are obliged to deliver to
or to share eventual spin-offs with the prime contractor.- 13 -
that successfull firms normally expand employment even if the
success rests upon a reduction in labour costs (i. e. we assume
that the output effect outweighs the substitution effect; [cf.
Donges et al., 1988; Verdoorn, 1956]).
The second and more directly operating concept for identifying
spin-offs is to try to capture the scientific or technological
value added of D&S financed productions, by simply counting
scientific publications of a firm's employees or, alternatively,
by counting the number of patents granted to firms. The working
hypothesis is that the number of scientific publications of em-
ployees (the number of patents granted) correlates positively
with the existence of spin-offs, and negatively in case of in-
efficiencies caused by government procurement. Both indicators
are technical in the sense that they say nothing about the market
value of spin-offs; in order to capture these, the first concept
ought to be applied. As regards the number-of-patents indicator,
it has been doubted whether these have lost their meaningfulness
in recent years [Glismann, Horn 1988a, pp. 1169 sqq.] because the
product cycles of new knowledge are said to have shortened and
therefore to have lessened the incentives to incur the time and
the risks of the red tape connected with patent application; the
risk is doublefold, consisting of the risk of refusal to grant a
patent and the risk of revealing crucial information to the
public. In addition, it is argued that patent laws have become
less applicable to today's fast changes in technology, especially
in the sphere of software production. The limitations of the pub-
lications variable are different in that publications are, in
most western countries, an important criterion for the career of
A speciality of the military-industrial complex is obviously
that the requirements of national security demand secrecy.
This would tend to lessen the significance of both the "real"
indicators of spin-offs. Even if the distribution of knowledge
creation is the same per dollar of sales for DoD sales and
civilian sales, the sign of the side effects of DoD contracts
may become negative due to the secrecy requirements (which
.means that a diagnosis of inefficiencies would possibly be a
consequence of the "system" rather than a real fact).- 14 -
a scientist. He will therefore devote part of the funds he re-
ceives from D&S contracts not only to research work but also to
writing a well-formulated essay and to forming and keeping up
connections which may help to publish. These activities besides
pure research absorb resources and they are, most importantly,
also in the interest of DoD and NASA who are in need of public
success stories as well. To put it differently: the publication
productivity of D&S contracts is not only a function of spin-offs
but also depends on marketing inputs.
All in all, of the indicators of spin-offs variables representing
economic success seem to be the most important ones. But it may
be argued from a methodological point of view that the question
of economic success can only be dealt with after spin-offs have
been proven in "real" terms, that is after the potential for eco-
nomic success has been elaborated.
c. The Method
We shall apply a simple cross-sectional regression analysis among
firms whose D&S shares vary between almost 100 percent and zero
percent (i. e. civilian firms). The central methodological idea
is that any firm's economic and technical efficiency depends on
inputs, the most important of which are capital investment and
R&D expenditures. In the case of a firm receiving R&D funds from
the government (such as RDT&E funds from DoD) the proceeds from
the work often go to the government - only in the case of some of
the RDT&E proceeds raising a firm's economic or technical well-
being we do have reason to suspect that a by-product has been
produced which can be called "spin-off". The same line of rea-
soning applies to the other kinds of D&S contracts and to NASA
contracts. In the case of RDT&E contracts lowering economic and
technical performance of firms this by-product is called "in-
efficiency" .
In addition we included the number of employees as a proxy for
firm size as an exogenous variable in order to prevent a bias in- 15 -
the results on account of systematically diverging firm size be-
tween defence and non-defence firms.
Since the search for spin-offs of D&S contracts as well as for
possible negative side-effects of D&S activities resembles the
search for a needle in a haystack we shall test several spin-off
indicators for correlation with several indicators of D&S activi-
ties. The following varieties of the central hypothesis are of
particular concern:
(1) The influence of RDT&E contracts on the four performance in-
dicators,
(a) patent productivity (as measured by a firm's number of
patents per employee);
(b) publication productivity (as measured by a firm's num-
ber of scientific publications per employee);
(c) firm growth (as measured by the average-annual rate of
change in the number of a firm's employees);
(d) rate of return on sales (as measured by a firm's net
profits relative to sales).
(2) The influence of defence contracts excluding RDT&E contracts
on the performance indicators (a)' to (d)', analogous to the
RDT&E analysis of (1).
(3) The influence of NASA contracts on the performance indica-
tors (a) '' to (d) '' analogous to the RDT&E analysis of (1) .
At a first sight, the most important analysis seems to be the one
of the effect of RDT&E expenditures which is about technical pro-
gress and the production of knowledge. Since, however, analyses
on NASA activities in particular tend to stress the above men-
tioned aspect of accelerating technical progress [Mathtech Inc.
1977; Mathematica Inc. 1976], analyses (2) and (3) may also
capture these demand effects.- 16 -
Tests of the hypotheses should yield positive signs between or-
ders and company performance in the case of spin-offs; negative
signs would result if inefficiencies accrued from D&S activities.
In view of the many relationships tested the problem of inter-
pretation in the most probable case of contradictory results must
be dealt with. A possible interpretation of test results (a) to
(d) and (a)' to (d)' could, for example be the following one:
"Because the coefficients of the hypotheses (a), (b), (c), (d),
(a)', (b)', (c)' and (d)' are positive and statistically signi-
ficant, there existed (per saldo) spin-offs in the form of ac-
celeration effects and of genuinely induced technical progress
during the period under consideration, leading to an increase in
profitability and company size as well as an increase in patent
productivity and publications per employee". There are yet two
other clear-cut constellations of regression coefficients, namely
in the case of all coefficients being insignificant or of all
coefficients being significantly negative. For example, if all
coefficients are significantly negative D&S expenditures would
have had negative side-effects.
In the regressions we used five years averages for periods
1975-79 and 1979-83 and pooled them. We chose these time periods
because of the availability of data on patents and publications
(see below: Sample and Data Basis). Multi-year averages are
presumed to deal with the distortions of the values of the
variables due to reasons of business cycles or other short-run
extraneous factors. Also, the averaging is more likely to capture
lagged relationships between incoming orders and firm perform-
ance.
We thank Dr. Michael Halperin of the Lippincott Library at the
University of Pennsylvania for his help in obtaining the pa-
tent and publication data.- 17 -
d. Sample and Data Basis
In contrast with the analysis of macro-level data, we have re-
sorted to firm-level analysis to compare the defence and space
oriented firms with a group of firms who have little or no de-
fence business. We have restricted our-study to the large public
firms for which information is available through publicly avail-
able databases. We have used PATSEARCH and SCISEARCH databases
available through the Institute of Scientific Information Inc. to
obtain information on patents and publications [Halperin & Cha-
krabarti: 1987]. The choice of the 93 companies (defence contrac-
tors, NASA contractors and comparable "civilian" companies) in-
vestigated in the end, started with all public companies in the
United States (more than 1000) for which data on company per-
formance can be obtained from generally accessible sources. The
defence contractors as well as the other companies were chosen
out of the investment goods sector (comprising firms which pro-
duce machinery, electronics, instruments and transport equip-
ment) , because the production of D&S goods is typically to be
assigned to this sector, according to the kind of final products
as well as according to the production technology applied. The
number of companies was further reduced by other data require-
ments - such as availability of time series for patents and
scientific publications - leading to 93 companies in the end.
Two kinds of statistics will be elaborated, each of them taking a
different sample out of these 93 companies. The first kind will
deal with the general characteristics of "defence contractors" as
opposed to the same characteristics of "non-defence contractors"
within the same type of industrial activity. The "defence con-
tractors" have been defined as firms (1) receiving 10 per cent or
more of their sales from DoD in the two periods 1970/75 and
1980/85 and (2) who were among the top 100 firms with respect to
DoD prime contracts. It turned out that 19 firms fell under this- 18 -
criterion; their characteristics are shown in Table 3. Of these
19 companies, 11 were important prime contractors of NASA at the
same time: the 11 firms were among the top 30 firms with respect
to NASA prime contracts in all the years considered. The "non-
defence contractors" consisted of 52 firms not listed among the
top 100 firms with respect to DoD prime contracts or to the top
30 of NASA contracts in the years mentioned.
The second sample refers to the regression analysis. It consists
of the 19 defence contractors and the 52 non-defence contractors
of the first sample plus 22 firms with a positive DoD-contract
share below 10 per cent in the years under consideration. Due to
a bottleneck in patent statistics, the period underlying the re-
2
gressions was taken to be 1975 to 1979, and 1979 to 1983.
The 19 companies are: 1. AVCO, 2. Boeing, 3. Fairchild, 4. Ge-
neral Electric, 5. Gould, 6. Grumman, 7. Honeywell, 8. Lock-
heed, 9. Martin Marietta, 10. McDonnell Douglas, 11. Northrop,
12. Raytheon, 13. Sanders Ass., 14. Teledyne, 15. Texas In-
struments, 16. Textron, 17. Tracor, 18. United Technologies,
19. Westinghouse. Of these 19 firms, the main prime contrac-
tors in terms of Dollars have been McDonnell Douglas, General
Electric, United Technologies, Boeing, and Lockheed; DoD con-
tracts have been most important (as measured by the DoD share
in total sales) for Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop,
Sanders Ass., and Tracor. With respect to "research, develop-
ment, test and evaluation" contracts, Martin Marietta and
Boeing have been the outstanding companies in terms of dollars
received as well as in terms of the respective sales shares.
The divergency of the firm samples in Tables 3 and 5 is thus
due to divergent designs. Since Table 3 is to demonstrate the
characteristics of the "typical" US DoD contractor we arbi-
trarily cut off firms with a DoD share below 10 percent. Such
a procedure was obviously not indicated in the regression ana-
lysis of Table 5, in fact there it would have made no sense at
all.- 19 -
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
Before we test the hypothesis outlined above it may be prudent to
have a general idea about the structural background of the D&S
industry, in particular the importance of DoD and NASA contracts
at the sectoral level (a); we shall also examine the main charac-
teristics of defence as opposed to non-defence firms (b); in ad-
dition, we shall present some information on the much discussed
issue of international competitiveness which is on the sectoral
level, too (c).
a. Importance of D&S in the Economy
Table 2 provides the data on the relative importance of D&S con-
tracts for different industries. The transportation equipment
industry depends heavily on DoD contracts as almost 20 per cent
of the average annual shipment is made to the defence; for the
electrical industry, every eighth dollar is earned by sales to
defence. 5 per cent of the shipment from the instrument industry
is made to the defence. Thus defence plays a big role in only a
few investment goods industries in the country. Space contracts
account for a much lower fraction of the total annual shipment,
also from these industries.
b. Characteristics of Defence and Non-Defence Firms
Table 3 provides information about the characteristics of defence
and non-defence firms during the periods 1970/75 and 1980/85. The
size of the typical major prime contractor is - when compared
with the 52 non-defence firms - considerably greater; the average
major defence contractor increased its employment from 70 000 to
80 000 (non-defence firms: from 18 000 to 20 000) employees.
Therefore, one may expect some scale effects also when contrast-
ing performances over time. In addition, as far as the large firm- 20 -
Table 2 - Average Annual Share of Shipments to Federal Government in the US,


















































Source: US Department of Commerce [current issues].- 21 -
Table 3 - Comparison of Defence and Non-defence Firms in the US, 1970-1985
Indicator
Sales in Bill. $
% of manuf. ind.
Employment in 1000
% of manuf. ind.
Gross Plant in Bill. $
% of manuf. ind.
Company-funded R & D
% of sales







% of manuf. ind.
Net Profits
% of sales
% of manuf. ind.
Total DoD Contracts
% of sales
% of all DoD contracts
RDT&E Contracts
% of sales
% of all RDT&E
NASA Contracts
% of sales

























For choice of these 19 companies see
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Based on data for 44 firms.
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Source: US Department of Defense [a and b, current issues]. - Aerospace In-
dustries Association [current issues]. - PAT-SEARCH data bank and
SCI-SEARCH data bank, cf. Michael R. Helperin and Alok K. Chakrabarti,
[1987]. - Own data bank compiled from COMPUSTAT data bank, "For-
tune", and "Business Week". - Own calculations.- 22 -
represents a higher degree of vertical integration of production
processes the sales should be relatively low (and the profit
sales ratio relatively high) when compared with the average of
non-defence firms. The 71 firms considered have had a share of
almost 10 per cent of total sales in the manufacturing sector
during the time period 1980/85. This share substantially in-
creases when all the 93 companies, which are included in the sub-
sequent regression analysis, are taken into consideration: The
middle group, with defence shares of less than 10 per cent, com-
prises some very large corporations such as IBM or General Mo-
tors. It should be noted here that General Dynamics and Rockwell
International were not included because of a lack of data on pa-
tents and publications. The corresponding employment shares were
even significantly higher as were, in particular for the de-
fence contractors, the shares of gross fixed capital stock. 30
per cent of the total defence contracts are registered for both
These were the only important defence-contracting firms in the
engineering industries not included in Table 2 or in the re-
gressions. As a matter of fact, there were performed some
time-series analyses elsewhere which included both these firms
but did not include as exogenous variables patents and publi-
cations [Glismann, Horn 1988b, p. 152, 157 and 158]. This
analysis showed that
- in cross-section analysis as well as in a combined cross-
section and time-series analysis (i. e. pool analysis) for
the years 1969, 1977 and 1985 the share of DoD contracts in
total sales had a significant negative impact on the pro-
fits/sales ratios and a significant positive impact on capi-
tal productivity (of the two other exogenous variables only
the investment shares were significant - positive with res-
pect to the profit/sales ratios and negative with respect to
capital productivity; R&D intensity did not show up to be
significant);
- in a firm-specific time-series analysis covering the years
1969 to 1985 the DoD intensity exhibited a negative sign
with respect to the profit/sales ratios in the case of
General Dynamics and no impact on capital productivity; in-
vestment activity turned out to improve the profit/sales
ratios significantly. As opposed to the cross-section and
pool analyses, the R&D intensity had a significant positive
impact on the profit ratios and on productivity in the case
of General Dynamics (this also held to be true for other
companies, such as Grumman).- 23 -
these subperiods. The share of NASA contracts decreased the se-
cond subperiod. This may be because the industrial structure of
NASA orders has more strongly changed than that of defence or-
ders, presumably with a rising importance of service companies
and commercial or public research institutions.
It is important to note that from 1970-75 to 1980-85 the weight
within the manufacturing sector of both defence contractors and
the civilian companies increased. Defence firms gained consider-
ably in terms of sales, employment, gross plant and company
funded R&D in the latter period under the Reagan Administration.
Whereas this may be considered a "Reagan effect" in defence pro-
curement, other indicators point in the opposite direction:
(a) decrease in the share of defence R&D contracts (while the
share of company-funded R&D rose relatively quickly);
(b) relatively low growth of patent output as percent of total
manufacturing from the defence firms;
(c) decrease in scientific publications from defence firms per
1000 employees.
All in all, there seem to exist considerable structural diver-
gencies between the defence and the non-defence firms. As has
been said above, structural divergencies may lead to performance
divergencies among firms, such as that companies which are on
average larger than their non-defence counterparts benefit from
scale effects and may, therefore, be more competitive inter-
nationally or may be more productive with respect to the creation
of knowledge.
c. Competitiveness and the Creation of Knowledge
In order to analyse the international competitiveness of indus-
tries a common approach is to rely on the working hypothesis that- 24 -
trade flows are perfect mirrors of international differences in
the costs of production; a country is said to have a revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) when it exports (x) more of a certain
product (i) than it imports (m), id est when xi/mi > 1, and vice
versa with respect to a revealed comparative disadvantage (xi/mi
< 1). Since misvaluations of currencies are almost a common pat-
tern in international trade the level effects of the exchange
rate are corrected for by comparison with an economy's average
trade performance (id est: (xi/mi)/((Zxi)/(Zmi)). Taking the
logarithm of this ratio (RCA = In[(xi/mi)/((Zxi)/(Zmi))] provides
for a dividing line of zero, with positive RCAs indicating com-
parative advantages, and negative RCAs indicating comparative
disadvantages. This procedure obviously cannot be executed on the
firm level because firms do not import substitutes to their own
production.
Creativity in the production of knowledge is measured here on the
industrial level, too, for the sake of comparison. It is taken to
be approximated by the patent output (Pat) per employee (Empl) in
industry (i) relative to the average patent productivity of the
manufacturing industry, id est ln[(Pati/Empli)/((ZPati)/
(ZEmpli))]. Again, zero is the dividing line between above and
below average performance in the production of new knowledge.
Table 4 allows a comparison of these "performance indicators"
with the "structural indicators" of the D&S-contract shares for
the relevant defence industries (cf. also Table 2). Since an ana-
lysis at the four digit level did not provide additionally mean-
ingful results, we report the data at the two digit level of the
Standard Industrial Classification. The table shows that D&S con-
tracts did not systematically involve industries characterized by
either a high inventive or high competitive position: The sector
receiving the highest shares of D&S contracts - transportation
equipment - had a patent productivity well below the manufactur-
ing average and was not far away from average regarding inter-
national competitiveness. On the other hand, the sector with the- 25 -








































































































Source: US Patent & Trademark Office [1985]. - Trade Relations Council of the US [1985]. - US
Department of Commerce [current issues]. - Own calculations.- 26 -
lowest share of D&S contracts - chemicals - showed a remarkably
good performance regarding knowledge production as well as inter-
national competitiveness. Taken together, rank correlations bet-
ween D&S intensity and the two performance indicators did not
come up with significant results; the same insignificance was ob-
tained when ranking the changes over time of both variables with
D&S intensity.
This leaves two interpretations open: firstly, D&S contracts did
not go to industries which were characterized by a particularly
high patent output or by a high degree of international competi-
tiveness. Secondly, it may as well be possible that D&S contracts
did not induce such higher levels of performance (or lower
levels, as a matter of fact). This may mean that D&S contracts
are not related with inventive activities or competitive factors
in any special way. Since the firms are widely diversified in
many industry categories, analysis at the firm level is necessary
to discern these issues.
d. Firm-Level Analysis
In the following, we concentrate on the search for indicators for
spin-offs at the firm-level, as discussed in section III. As has
been outlined there, we define two endogenous variables as being
indicators of the "economic efficiency", and two further endo-
genous variables as being indicators of the "technical efficien-
cy". In the case of D&S spending raising either "technical effi-
ciency" or "economic efficiency" we would have first evidence of
systematic spin-offs across firms which, of course, does not say
anything about the kind of spin-offs realized (i. e. whether it
is a new kind of sun-glasses or a new coating for frying pans).
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis performed:- 27 -
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Source: Own calculations.- 28 -
(a) The standard variables of industrial organisation economics,
capital formation and own R&D activities, proved mostly re-
levant without striking contradictions. Investment in fixed
assets showed a close relation with both company growth and
profitability. Own R&D activity correlated strongly with
technical efficiency and with economic efficiency as mea-
sured by profitability.
(b) Military R&D contracts did not contribute positively or ne-
gatively to economic or technical efficiency in the periods
under consideration.
(c) Space expenditures did not contribute to an improvement of
economic performance as measured by company growth and pro-
fitability. NASA contracts were also not associated with
patent productivity; but they helped to raise the number of
scientific publications per employee.
(d) Defense expenditures, excluding RDT&E, were also not of im-
portance for the overall economic efficiency but they con-
tributed to an increase of success with scientific publi-
cations .
In reviewing these results we note that we find no indication of
spin-offs. Size differences across firms do play a role only in
explaining the rate of growth of the firms, implying that eco-
nomies of scale matter. Also, it is interesting that military
R&D, in contrast to own R&D activity, contributed to an increase
of neither "technical efficiency" nor "economic efficiency". It
is worthwhile mentioning that the real output of technical novel-
ties as measured by patent productivity is exclusively determined
by own R&D activity while scientific publications also depend on
government funding. This may reflect the "publish or perish" syn-
drome of the American scientific community reinforced by the de-
sire for publicity of the public funding agency. It has to be
taken into consideration, however, that, until recently, it has- 29 -
been difficult for private organizations to patent the results of
the work funded by the government. As has been argued above (III,
c) patents and publications may be substitutes for each other
[see also Halperin and Chakrabarti, 1987]. Publications may docu-
ment the scientific progress without intellectual property rights




The importance of the defence and space contracts differs for
different industries in the USA. Electrical and transportation
equipment industries depend on the Department of Defense as their
major customer. We also observed that in recent years the large
defence firms increased their importance in the economy as they
account for a large proportion of employment. The technical per-
formance of the defence industry in terms of patents and publi-
cations did not improve during the Reagan Administration. On the
contrary, publication efficiency of the large defence firms de-
creased during the 1980s as compared to the 1970s.
On a macro level we observed that industries relatively dependent
on defence and space contracts did not perform any better than
other industries in terms of their patent productivity or inter-
national competitiveness. If anything, industries highly depen-
dent on defence contracts performed poorly in terms of their
technical productivity and competitiveness.
On account of the uncertainties regarding the quality of data or
the adequate definition of spin-offs we used two indicators of
technical success in the inter-firm analysis, patents, and scien-
A test for substitution between patents and publications, ob-
vious as it may seem to be, cannot be performed: DoD contract-
ing firms do not publish their patent and publication statis-
tics separately for the civil goods producing units and for
the military goods producing units.- 30 -
tific publications, and two indicators of economic success, pro-
fitability and firm-growth rate. We tested their relationship
with three indicators of D&S activities, military R&D (RDT&E),
other defence contracts, and NASA contracts. The results indicate
that D&S expenditures are hardly conducive to promote technical
and economic efficiency.
It thus appears that D&S expenditures are not an appropriate in-
strument of a policy aiming at fastening technical progress.
There may be, of course, other important aims which do not have
spin-offs as a strategic variable - aims such as the internatio-
nal prestige or the simple protection against domestic or foreign
competitors. D&S expenditures are therefore not the effective
means to achieve a superior international competitive position
for the US. Contrary to the frequently supported hypothesis it
seems that the technological leadership which the United States
unquestionably possessed in many areas may not be based on its
intensive D&S activities. This conclusion is supported by the
above analysis of international competitiveness as revealed in
trade flows at a high level of aggregation. We note here that our
firm level analysis does not lead us to conclude that D&S expen-
ditures cause a loss for the overall economy. Although it may be
argued that demand for qualified technical personnel from the
defence sector creates additional scarcity for the civilian
sector in industry and academe, one has to take into account
national security is a fundamental precondition for the develop-
ment of the civilian economy.
The study was restricted to an efficiency analysis in a cross
section comparison. The questions regarding effects of D&S ac-
tivities on market structures and competition were not dealt
with. These issues are, however, also highly relevant in discus-
sions about the military industrial complex.- 31 -
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